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ABSTRACT
This report contains information about the tasks I have completed and the valuable
experience I have gained at NASA. The report is divided into two different sections
followed by a program summary sheet. The first section describes the two reports I have
completed for the Office of Mission Assurance (OMA). I describe the approach and the
resources and facilities used to complete each report. The second section describes my
experience working in the Receipt Inspection/Quality Assurance Lab (RI/QA).
The fix'st report described is a Product Assurance Plan for the Gas Permeable
Polymer Materials (GPPM) mission. The purpose of the Product Assurance Plan is to
define the various requirements which are to be met through completion of the GPPM
mission. The GPPM experiment is a space payload which will be flown in the shuttle's
SPACEHAB module. The experiment will use microgravity to enable production of
complex polymeric gas permeable materials.
The second report described in the first section is a Fracture Analysis for the Mir
Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP). The Fracture Analysis report is a summary of
the fracture control classifications for all structural elements of the MEEP. The MEEP
hardware consists of four experiment carders, each of which contains an experiment
container holding a passive experiment. The MEEP hardware will be attached to the
cargo bay of the space shuttle. It will be transferred by Extravehicular Activity and
mounted on the Mir space station.
The second section of this report describes my experiences in the RI/QA lab. I
listed the different equipment I used at the lab and their functions. I described the
extensive inspection process that must be completed for spaceflight hardware. Included,
at the end of this section, are pictures of most of the equipment used in the lab.
There is a summary sheet located at the end of this report. It briefly describes the
valuable experience I have gained at NASA this summer and what I will be able to take
with me as I return to college. I briefly discuss the experiences I mentioned in the
previous three paragraphs along with training classes I attended and courses I completed
at the Learning Lab.
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OFFICE OF MISSION ASSURANCE (OMA)
Product AssurancePlan
My f'wst project consisted of preparing a Product Assurance (PA) Plan for the Gas
Permeable Polymer Materials (GPPM) mission. The purpose of the Product Assurance
Plan is to define the requirements for configuration management, reliability, quality
assurance, parts, materials, processes, and system safety which are applicable for design,
procurement, fabrication, assembly/disassembly, and test operations for Langley Research
Center deliverables through completion of the GPPM mission.
The purpose of the GPPM experiment is to use microgravity to enable production
of complex polymeric gas permeable materials. This experiment will be put aboard the
SPACEHAB module which is integrated into the Orbiter cargo bay. SPACEHAB
provides a shirtsleeve environment for performance of multiple experiments.
The material resources I used to accomplish this task were the manual (LHB
5300.1), the handbooks NHB 5300.4(1B) and 5300/4(1A- 1), and a PA Plan for a
previously completed experiment. The human resources I took advantage of, in the Office
of Mission Assurance, to complete the plan were the program assurance manager, GPPM
project personnel, payload safety engineer, and the reliability engineer.
The first section of the Product Assurance Plan includes the classification of the
payload, the mission success criteria and a list of the Office of Mission Assurance's
Product Assurance Services. GPPM is a "Class D" payload. This means that this payload
has objectives worth achieving at a cost not to exceed the amount required for a single
low cost attempt where single failure points are acceptable and formal verification
requirements are limited to those necessary for safety and compatibility. The mission
success criteria for the GPPM experiment will be met if it maintains mechanical and
electrical integrity from launch through landing and has the capability to enable a variety of
sample tube monomer mixtures to polymerize. I worked with the program assurance
manager to determine all of the items to be furnished to the Project Leader at appropriate
times.
The second section of the PA plan states where the GPPM Project Team
Organization can be found and describes the responsibilities of the Product Assurance
Engineer. The Product Assurance Engineer is responsible for assuring the overall
implementation of the requirements of the PA plan consistent with the intent of the
Product Assurance Instruction 5300.1 "Program Assurance: General Policy,
Responsibility, Authority, and Implementation."
The reliability assessment and design specifications for the GPPM are included in
the third section of the PA plan. I found out, from the reliability engineer, the type of
reliability analysis that will be done on GPPM. The GPPM had been flown on previous
missions successfully without a reliability analysis being done. Therefore, a reliability
analysis does not need to be done for the current experiment Design data will be
reviewed to ensure that quality, reliability, and safety considerations have been factored
into the flight hardware design.
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The fourth section of the PA plan establishes a Configuration Management System
for the control of the GPPM experiment. This section cites the way design changes are
dealt with and how parts, materials, and processes are to be accounted. The GPPM
Project Manager shall be responsible for providing and implementing a GPPM
Configuration Management Plan prior to fabrication of flight hardware. The plan should
identify the configuration management system to accurately clef'me and control the
configuration of flight hardware, spares, and ground support equipment.
Procurement Program Assurance is covered in the fifth section of the PA plan.
The purchase request review, receiving and inspection, the acceptance/rejection of
received articles, receipt inspection and supplier documentation requirements are
contained in this section.
The sixth section covers parts, material selection, and process control. Parts shall
be selected which optimize design and performance to certain extents specified. The
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Manager shall approve all EEE
parts in the GPPM hardware and is responsible for qualification, screening, testing, and
failure analysis as required. The EEE Parts Engineer shall develop the GPPM Parts list
and show lot/date codes as appropriate. Fasteners received at Langley Aerospace
Research Center will be verified by the Receiving and Inspection Lab per GPPM
specifications (I was able to do this task of verifying fasteners at the Receiving and
Inspection lab as I will describe under the topic heading "Receipt Inspection/Quality
Assurance Lab"). A materials and limited life items list shall be prepared. Metals will be
selected using MSFC 522B "Design Criteria for Controlling Stress Corrosion Cracking,"
as a reference and all GPPM hardware will satisfy outgassing constraints in accordance
with JSC 09604F/MSFC-HDBK-527F.
Quality control requirements are contained in the seventh section of the PA plan.
Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD), fabrication control, inspection and testing,
assembly and integration, nonconforming articles and material control, bonded stores,
metrology control, QA stamp control, the end-item data package and handling
preservation and shipping all have requirements included under quality control. Most of
these topics' requirements are defined in certain cited handbooks. The end-item data
package provides cognizance of the functional characteristics, and flight worthiness of the
hardware to be shipped and subsequently maintains configuration accountability.
The eighth and final section describes what will be done for system safety of the
GPPM experiment. A reflown assessment will be developed and documented based on
the Safety Analysis presented to the Safety Review Panel for previous flights. All safety
reviews shall be held in accordance with the phased system as defined in NSTS 13830B.
520
Fracture Analysis
My second project consisted of preparing a fracture analysis report on the Mir
Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP). The MEEP hardware consists of a sidewall
carrier and four Passive Experiment Carriers (PEC), each of which contains an experiment
container holding a passive experiment. The PEC's will be attached to the cargo bay of
the space shuttle. They will be transferred by Extravehicular Activity and then mounted
on the Mir space station.
The fracture analysis report is required for the flight certification of Shuttle
payloads by NHB 8071.1. The fracture analysis report is a summary of the fracture
control classifications for all structural elements of the MEEP. Each component may fit
under one of five categories: contained, fail-safe, low risk fracture, low released mass, or
fracture critical. The structural elements have been fabricated from materials that have
high resistance to stress corrosion cracking (SCC). For each part, the material is listed
along with its SCC classification.
The first step that needed to be taken, in order for me to be able to determine the
information needed to complete the requirements stated in the paragraph above, was to
obtain the drawings for the hardware under consideration. I obtained the drawings from
the aerospace system engineers who drew them. These drawings of the individual
structures of the MEEP show the material of which each component is made. I then
listed, in my report, the components of the MEEP, followed by the material they are made
of and the stress corrosion cracking (SCC) classification of the material. The SCC
classification for each material was obtained from the booklet "Design Criteria for
Controlling Stress Corrosion Cracking." A classification of 1 indicates high resistance to
SCC, 2 indicates moderate resistance, and 3 indicates low resistance.
I then studied the drawings of each component very carefully to determine their
fracture classifications. A full-scale model of the MEEP was also available, in the systems
engineering building, to study in order to get a better picture of its components. In order
to classify each component, I determined fractures that could occur in each component
that would cause a worst case scenario. If a component is classified as being contained, it
can fracture and not be a threat to the payload of the shuttle, due to it being contained by
a surrounding structure. A fail-safe component is designed with redundancy, which means
if one part of its structure failed there would still be another structure holding the part in
place. Low released mass is a classification given to a structure which does not have the
potential to do damage to the shuttle payload if it fails, due to its light weight (Mass < 2.5
lb.). The classification "fracture critical," raises the most concern of all the possible
classifications a structure can be labeled. If a structure is fracture critical, it may cause
damage to the shuttle if it fails (catastrophic failure). Engineers try to design the
structures to contain a minimal number of fracture critical pans. Low risk fracture is a
classification which permits hardware which would ordinarily be defined as "fracture
critical" to be classified as "non-fracture critical" when the possibility of failure due to a
crack-like flaw can be shown to be extremely remote.
Every component of the MEEP was made of either 6061-T6 AL, 7075-T73 AL,
A286 SST, or 300 series SST. These are all materials which have high resistance to stress
corrosion cracking and therefore, in the analysis, each component was given a SCC
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classification of 1. Most of the components of tile MEEP were identified during the
analysis as being either fail-safe or a low released mass. The attention should be drawn to
the two components which were found to be fracture critical. These components are the
hook latches located on top of the experiment container and on the sidewall carrier and
the latch plate pins which join the latches to the sidewall carrier (drawings of these
components along with the entire MEEP structure are shown below). If a crack
propagated at the bottom of the hook latch, above where it is bolted on to the structure,
causing the component to fail, it would become a projectile. This projectile would weigh
more than .25 pounds and has potential to do damage to the shuttle payload (if it weighed
less than .25 pounds, it would be considered a low release mass as stated earlier). The
latch plate pins arc also considered fracture critical since if one failed, the entire latch
assembly would become a projectile which weighs much more than .25 pounds. Stricter
and more numerous inspections will be done on these fracture critical components.
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MEEP Payload Drawing
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Receipt Inspection / Quality Assurance (RUQA) Lab
I was fortunate enough to be able to spend some time working with the inspectors
at the Receipt Inspection/Quality Assurance (RI/QA) Lab. The inspectors are employed
by Mason & Hanger who are contractors at NASA. I conducted various quality
inspections and verification tests of incoming stock and spaceflight hardware. I gained
experience on the equipment used in the inspection process. The following list shows the
equipment I used. There are pictures of most of these machines at the end of this section.
• Cutting Saw - cuts a section of material to be mounted by the mounting processing
system.
• Mounting Press - encapsulates specimens to be metallographically prepared and
examined.
Grinder - prepares samples for metallographic examination by using progressively
smaller abrasive materials to remove distorted surface material from the sample so it
can be studied under a microscope.
• Stereoscope/Microscope Video package - allows low and high magnification of
prepared samples to view surface coatings and to determine surface discontinuities.
• Measurement System - video measurement system which measures coating thickness
and non-conformities.
EDAX (energy dispersive X-ray fluorescence) system - Spectra chemical microanalysis
system which uses X-ray energy to excite unknown elements causing them to give off
their own specific energy which allows each element to be identified in a test specimen.
• Magnaflux F.P.I. Processing System - uses florescent penetrant inspection to detect
discontinuities exposed to a specimens surface.
• Hardness Tester - performs the Rockwell Hardness Test to determine the hardness of
a specimen.
• Micro-hardness Tester - performs the Rockwell Hardness Test on very small and thin
samples.
• Tensile Tester - determines the mechanical properties of a specimen, such as, ultimate
tensile strength and reduction of area.
• Laser Thread Measurement System - non-contact thread measurement system used for
determining root radius, flank angles, functional diameter, etc.
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In the inspection process, there is a chart that is followed in the lab which specifies
the number of samples that must be tested from a certain lot, depending on the number of
pieces contained in the lot. The most ideal method would be to test every part in a lot, but
this takes too much time and money to be effective. The idea is to choose samples which
represent the entire population. NASA follows the "zero-defect" policy. This policy
states that ff one of the pieces in the lot does not meet its' specifications, the whole lot is
rejected. This strict rejection policy gets the manufacturer's attention providing an extra
incentive to make parts strict to their specifications.
During my time at the lab, screws were the main items being tested. First, every
inspection machine must be calibrated. Then I would pick a designated number of samples
out of the lot, referring to a chart. Then I would perform a variety of tests on the samples.
The ftrst test I would perform on these samples is a visual test. This would consist
of seeing if they would properly screw into a pre-tapped hole of the screws specified
measurement, and simply looking at the screw to see if there were any noticeable defects.
Then one sample from each lot would be tested for its proper thread dimensions using the
Laser Thread Measurement System. This is a very precise non-destructive test, which
virtually eliminates human error. NASA is one of the few places to have purchased one of
these devices.
Then a chemical test is performed to see if the sample was made of the material
specified. Many times manufacturers have sold zinc coated screws to NASA, while telling
NASA they were coated with cadmium. This is because it is cheaper and easier for the
manufacturers to coat screws with zinc, and they could still charge cadmium coating
prices, if this went undetected. The EDAX machine keeps manufacturers from getting
away with delivering pieces made with material other than what was specified in the
contract. The EDAX is an X-ray device which can determine the percentage of each
element present in a sample.
A tensile test or hardness test should then be done on the sample. A tensile test
can be done on most screws and is done to see if it meets or exceeds the minimum tensile
strength stated in the specifications. The screw's length and width must be measured
before and after the test in order for the elongation and reduction of area to be calculated.
This is a destructive test which literally pulls the screw until it breaks apart in order to find
it's ultimate tensile strength.
If the screw can not be placed in the tensile test machine, it must be prepared for a
Rockwell Hardness test to be executed with either the Hardness Tester or the Micro-
hardness tester, depending on the specimen's size. The preparation phase is a rather long
process for this test. First the specimen should be cut, using the cutting saw, to about one
centimeter long. Then, the specimen is mounted using the Mounting Press. A flat,
polished surface, free from obstructions must be exposed in order to do the hardness test.
Therefore, a grinder is used to achieve this purpose, using progressively smaller abrasive
materials to remove distorted surface material. After this process is finished, the sample
can then be tested for hardness. A test for coating thickness can also be done to the
specimen after it has been prepared in the way stated.
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In order to see if a specimen has been coated with the specified amount of
material, the Stereoscope/Microscope Video package is used along with the video
Measurement system. The specimen is magnified many times with this system. The image
of the specimen is shown on a monitor. Pointers can then be toggled around the coating
layer of the specimen on the video screen. The system automatically measures the
distance between the two pointers, determining the coating thickness of the specimen.
This entire system can also be used to show irregularities in the material. The system can
print a picture of the image displayed on the monitor to be used for the sake of argument
when dealing with manufacturers of faulty components.
The Magnaflux F.P.I. Processing System is used mainly for pressure fittings to see
if there are discontinuities on the surface of the specimen. One must be a level III
inspector in order to do diagnose faults in specimens, using this test.
With NASA's zero defect policy, if any of the tests mentioned above, shows a
result which does not agree with the specifications of the part being examined, all of the
parts are rejected. During my stay, only one of the lots I worked with was rejected. It
was rejected because there were bolts contained in this same lot made by two different
manufacturers. This was made illegal, since the parts lose their tractability causing it to be
impossible, at times, to hold a specific manufacturer accountable for the quality of their
products.
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This is an example of output from the EDAX (energy dispersive X-ray
fluorescence) system which is a spectra chemical microanalysis system that uses X-
ray energy to excite unknown elements causing them to give off their own specific
energy which allows each element to be identified in a test specimen. The purpose of
this specific inspection test was to determine if a screw was coated with zinc as stated
in its specifications. The screw was, in fact, coated by zinc as shown by the graph on
this page.
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